QUALITIES OF RHETORICAL EXPRESSION
IN PHILODEMUS

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In three early commentaries on Philodemus' Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Sudhaus, Hubbell, and Tait each observed that the first part of Book IV was devoted to a discussion of expression; they also noted that this part was composed of two theoretical segments, one presenting a general theory of "beautiful expression" (I 148 III 1—154 X 19), the other treating certain qualities of expression in some detail (I 154 X 20—182 XXIV 25).[1] Using the latter treatment as a starting point, my purpose in this essay is to reconstruct a list of qualities which Philodemus viewed as proper to rhetorical expression.

The interpretation of I 154 X 120—182 XXIV 25 that is now generally accepted was first proposed by Grube. According to Grube, the contents of the passage followed "the general formula of the four qualities or virtues [of style]" as illustrated below:[2]

Qualities or Virtues of Style[3]	Philodemean Topics
1. Correct Language	1. Ἑλληνικὴ ἑρμηνεία
2. Clarity	2. ἀσάφεια
3. Appropriateness	3. τὸ πρέπον
4. Ornamentation	4. ἐγκατάσκευος λόγος

Although this interpretation is informative, it nevertheless exhibits two weaknesses.

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[1] Siegfried Sudhaus, *Philodemi volumina rhetorica* I (Leipzig 1892) XXXVII–XXXVIII; Harry M. Hubbell, "The *Rhetorica* of Philodemus," *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences* 23 (1920) 293–94; J. I. M. Tait, *Philodemus' Influence on the Latin Poets*, Diss. Bryn Mawr 1941 (Ann Arbor 1941) 96–97. Here and elsewhere the text of Περὶ ῥητορικῆς to which I refer is located in *Philodemi volumina rhetorica* I and II, ed. Siegfried Sudhaus (Leipzig 1892–96); citations are to volume, page, column, and line of this edition.

[2] G. M. A. Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics* (London 1965) 203. This view is exactly followed by Aldo Scaglione, *The Classical Theory of Composition from its Origins to the Present: A Historical Survey*, University of North Carolina Studies in Comparative Literature 53 (Chapel Hill 1972) 52.

[3] This "formula" is composed of the Peripatetic ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως; see Grube (above, note 2) 138 and more generally Wilhelm Kroll, "Rhetorik," *RE*, Supplementband 7, cols. 1071–73.

One is that the interpretation inaccurately describes Philodemus' comments at I 156 XIII 6—161 XIX 27. Grube argues that within this passage Philodemus discusses two topics which represent distinct qualities or virtues of style. In particular, he observes that while ἀσάφεια (which represents clarity) is treated from I 156 XIII 6 to I 160 XVII 27,[4] by I 161 XIX 9 the subject has shifted to τὸ πρέπον (= appropriateness).[5] This view of I 156 XIII 6—161 XIX 27 seems problematic in two respects.

First, Grube's specific assertion that the passage somehow discusses the expressive quality, appropriateness, seems doubtful. As the sole evidence for this claim, Grube offers a reference to τὸ πρέπον in the sentence fragment at I 161 XIX 7-12:

> . . . ταῖς [κα]θωμι[λημέ]ναις χ[ρ]ῆσθαι μετὰ τοῦ πρέποντ[ο]ς, καὶ
> μήτ᾽ ἀκύρως μήτ[ε] καθολικῶς μήτε κοινῶς ἀλλὰ ῥητῶς
> ἐκφέρειν.[6]

However, when the immediate context of this reference is considered, it is clear that τὸ πρέπον is not employed technically, as an expressive quality; rather it is used nontechnically, as an attribute of the correct or desirable usage of current expressions.[7] Thus, Grube's interpretation apparently misconstrues Philodemus' use of τὸ πρέπον at I 161 XIX 9, and accordingly its location of a technical treatment or mention of appropriateness within I 156 XIII 6—161 XIX 27 is without textual support.

Second, Grube's more general assertion that two qualities of expression are represented in Philodemus' comments at I 156 XIII 6—161 XIX 27 is inconsistent with the continuity of subject matter that is apparent in the passage. Granting Grube's characterization of I 156 XIII 6—160 XVII 27 as a discussion of ἀσάφεια, the only segment of the text wherein a significant shift of subject matter could occur would be I 160 XVIII 7—161 XIX 27. Yet, upon a close examination of this portion of the text, it becomes clear (1) that I 160 XVIII 7—161 XVIII 27 extends Philodemus' discussion of ἀσάφεια (defining in the process three unintentional forms

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[4] Grube does not specify the extension of Philodemus' discussion of ἀσάφεια with any precision; accordingly, the boundaries of the discussion have been established based on a comparison of Grube's interpretative remarks with the content of the text.

[5] Specifically regarding I 161 XIX 9, Grube (above, note 2) 203 comments as follows: "There is a brief reference to appropriateness (τὸ πρέπον, the third virtue) but the context is missing and it may only be incidental." Despite Grube's caution here, such a comment necessarily commits him to the position that the expressive quality, appropriateness, is either treated or mentioned following I 160 XVII 27 and prior to the discontinuation of the text at I 161 XIX 27.

[6] ". . . to use ordinary expressions with fitness and to produce (words) neither in an improper sense, nor in general terms, nor ambiguously, but rather expressly."

[7] For this interpretation of τὸ πρέπον at I 161 XIX 9, see also George L. Kustas, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric* (Thessaloniki 1973) 66.

of obscurity),[8] (2) that I 161 XIX 6–12 specifies two standards for expressive clarity (viz., the proper use of common expressions and the express use of words),[9] and (3) that I 161 XIX 13–27 outlines Philodemus' objections to some previous handling of issues which are currently under consideration.[10] Thus, the whole of I 160 XVIII 7—161 XIX 27 is evidently related either directly or indirectly to clarity, the same quality of expression with which Philodemus is concerned between I 156 XIII 6 and I 160 XVII 27. Accordingly, Grube's claim that two qualities of expression are represented within I 156 XIII 6—161 XIX 27 is not consistent with the text.

Another weakness in Grube's interpretation is that it presents Philodemus' discussion of expressive qualities as if the text of the discussion were continuous. The problem with this procedure is that it ignores a significant lacuna which must exist between the extant portions of the two papyri that make up the discussion, viz., *1423* and *1007*.[11] For the existence of this lacuna, there is both textual and papyrological support. The text manifests a clear discontinuity of subject matter across the junction of the two rolls. In the last column of *1423* the topic under discussion is certainly associated with clarity or its opposite, obscurity; yet, the first column of *1007* begins in the middle of a discussion of the

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[8] . . . καθόλου τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, ὧν ἔκθεσ[ιν] ἐν τοῖς περὶ τούτων ποιούμεθα λόγοις. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἃ καὶ παρά τισι τῶν τεχνογράφων κατακεχώρισται, διὰ τὸ καταπυκνοῦν τοῖς ὑπερβατοῖς οὐκ οὔσης ἀνάγκης χρησιμεύειν ὑπολαμβάνοντας, ἂν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἦι χρῆσθα[ι], μὴ βραχύτατον ὡς μάλιστα τὸν [λόγον] ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ[ν σύ]νδε[σμον μὴ] διὰ [βραχέ]ων ἀ[ν]ταπο[δι]δόν[αι] κα[ὶ . . . . .]ασ.ακ. . . . . πω . . ους . υ . . νο . . . " . . . generally the other differences, from which we construct (the) exposition in the arguments concerning these things. In addition to these, which are recorded by some of the writers on rhetoric, (unstudied obscurity arises) from the concentrated use of hyperbata, when they believe it is useful, although it is not necessary, and if it is necessary to be used, (from) not making the phrase the very shortest possible and (from) the connecting particle not corresponding after short spaces . . ."

[9] For text and translation, see above p. 72 and note 6.

[10] Τὰ δὲ πράγμαθ' ὅτ[ι] τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ὡμοίωται, τὰ δὲ διαφέρει, καὶ τὰ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὰ δ' ἧττον, τὰ δ' ὡμο[ί]ωται καὶ διαφέρει κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο κ[ατὰ] συμβεβηκός, καὶ [τὰ] μὲν ἐστιν ἐναρ[γ]ῆ τελέως, τὰ [δ'] ὡς [ἐκ συλ]λογισμοῦ, δ[ῆ]λον, ὅτι οὐ]δ' ὅλως ἐκτ[εθείκασιν.] Τὰς [δὲ ν]οήσ[εις ὅτι τὰς] μὲν [ἀ]πὸ μ . . . . ει . . . τησ "But because some things (?) correspond with one another, while others differ, some more, some less, and some correspond and differ according to one thing after another by accident, and some are perfectly manifest, while others are manifest as if from syllogism, it is clear, they have set out (the matter) not completely. . . ."

[11] Here and elsewhere italicized numerals refer to papyri in the Herculanean collection. That Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Book IV, was originally composed of the rolls now represented by papyri *1423* and *1007* (in that order) is not a matter of controversy. See Sudhaus (above, note 1) XI–XII, XVIII–XIX; Walter Scott, *Fragmenta Herculanensia: A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oxford Copies of the Herculanean Rolls* (Oxford 1885) 79, 83; I. Quadrari, *Philodemi de rhetorica libri IV pars prior,* in *Herculanensium voluminum quae supersunt* XI, ed. and trans. I. Quadrari and A. A. Scott (Naples 1855) I.

sound of language as a variable in expressive elaboration. The papyri too suggest that some portion of the text may be missing. Specifically, although the earlier, *1423*, is concluded by a colophon after its final column of writing, the latter, *1007*, entirely lacks any sign of the title column that would presumably have preceded its initial column of writing.[12] Obviously, if the title column of *1007* has been lost, then other columns of the papyrus may be lost as well.

As a consequence of his disregard for the lacuna between *1423* and *1007*, Grube overlooks the possibility that materials representing one or more qualities of expression may have perished. Therefore, even if Grube's interpretation were not otherwise objectionable, his claim that Philodemus' discussion at I 154 X 20—182 XXIV 25 follows the general formula of the *four* virtues of style would hardly seem cogent.

In light of the weaknesses apparent in Grube's account, a revised interpretation of I 154 X 20—182 XXIV 25 would seem to be required. To this end, I propose the following general description for the textual remains of the passage in question:[13]

Text Segment	*Topic(s)*	*Quality Represented*
I 154 X 20— 156 XII 27	Ἑλληνικὴ ἑρμηνεία	Correctness
I 156 XIII 6— 161 XIX 27	ἀσάφεια and perhaps σαφήνεια	Clarity
Lacuna	. . .	. . .
I 162 I 1— 182 XXIV 25	ἐγκατάσκευος λόγος or κατασκευή	Elaboration

This description has two important consequences. First, it indicates that within Philodemus' extant discussion of expressive qualities only three qualities are represented. Second, it implies that unless Philodemus' conception of the qualities of rhetorical expression was naively undifferentiated (which seems unlikely[14]), then the remains of his discussion are incomplete.

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[12] These locations of titles in *1423* and *1007* are given by Scott (above, note 11) 83–84 and confirmed by Maria Cecaro, Il Direttore, Biblioteca Nazionale "Vittorio Emanuele III," Naples, in correspondence of 10 August 1980 addressed to the author. The expectation that *1007* would be preceded by a title page is a natural one given that numerous Herculanean papyri exhibit initial titles (see Scott [above, note 11] 19–92). Regarding the practice of placing titles at both the beginning and end of literary papyri generally, see Robert Devreese, *Introduction à l'étude des manuscrits grecs* (Paris 1954) 8, and Edward Maunde Thompson, *An Introduction to Greek and Latin Palaeography* (Oxford 1912) 47.

[13] This description largely accepts Grube's view of I 154 X 20—156 XII 26 and I 162 I 1—182 XXIV 25, while correcting the problems to which his account of I 156 XIII 6—162 I 1 gives rise.

[14] Taxonomies of expressive qualities in the Peripatetic, Stoic, and Academic schools of the third and second centuries consistently identified more than three such qualities. A set of

Given that I 154 X 20—182 XXIV 25 comprises the only surviving treatment of expressive qualities within Philodemus' rhetorical works, the preceding interpretation suggests that any *exhaustive* reconstruction of the qualities viewed by Philodemus as proper to rhetorical expression must necessarily involve a conjecture as to what Philodemean quality or qualities are unrepresented by significant treatment in that discussion. As a plausible basis for a conjecture of the required sort I submit Philodemus' remarks at Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, XXIX 28–36:

... καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἐ[μ]φ[ατ]κῶς ἢ σαφῶς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε
συντόμως καὶ εὐπρεπῶς καὶ κομψῶς καὶ πολλαῖς ἄλλαις
ἰδιότησι πεποικιλμένως ἀξιώσει τις· καὶ κοινῶς ὁ διορισμὸς
[εἶν]αι δόξει καὶ τῶν [ἀπο]δεικτικῶν λόγων·[15]

Crucial in this passage is Philodemus' reference to five expressive qualities which he says are applicable to demonstrative prose discourses; these are ἔμφασις, σαφήνεια, συντομία, εὐπρέπεια, and κομψεία.[16] Now, because Philodemus certainly considered demonstrative prose discourse within the province of rhetoric,[17] it seems only reasonable to conclude that these qualities may be collated with those represented in Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Book IV, to produce an authoritative list of six qualities which Philodemus believed were proper to rhetorical expression (see Table 1). Quite obviously, this collation entails the conjecture that forcefulness, brevity, and appropriateness constitute Philodemean qualities of rhetorical expression which are not represented by significant treatment in Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Book IV.

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four Peripatetic qualities, Ἑλληνισμός, σαφήνεια, πρέπον, and κόσμος or κατασκευή (already mentioned above in note 3), may have been formalized as early as Theophrastus. (For a strong assertion of this view, see Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *AJP* 62 [1941] 43–44.) Again, according to Diogenes Laertius, a five-quality analysis was proposed by the Stoics as part of their theory of grammar: Ἀρεταὶ δὲ λόγου εἰσὶ πέντε, Ἑλληνισμός, σαφήνεια, συντομία, πρέπον, κατασκευή. (*De clarorum philosophorum vitis* 7.59). Likewise, as reported in Cicero's *De partitione oratoria* 19–20, the Academics recognized five qualities of words and their combinations—*dilucidum, breve, probabile, illustre, suave.* Given Philodemus' sophistication, it seems improbable that he would simply posit a three-quality analysis when more inclusive four- and five-quality analyses had been current for nearly a century.

[15] *Philodemos Über die Gedichte, Fünftes Buch,* ed. and trans. Christian Jensen (Berlin 1923) 65. "Also, there are times when someone will require that (the expression be) not more forceful than clear, as well as brief, appropriate, refined, and provided with many other properties. And the definition seems to be universal even for demonstrative prose discourses."

[16] For the view that the passage here treated represents Philodemus' own position, see J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism: A Study in Tendencies* (New York 1962) 375 note 4, 477 note 7.

[17] See I 373 XCIV 6–10.

Table 1

A Collation of Expressive Topics appearing in Περὶ ῥητορικῆς,
Book IV, and in Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V

Qualities of Expression Represented	Topics in Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Book IV, I 154 X 20— 182 XXIV 25	Topics in Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, XXIX 28–36
Correctness	Ἑλληνικὴ ἑρμηνεία	
Clarity	ἀσάφεια and perhaps σαφήνεια	σαφῶς
Forcefulness[18]		ἐμφατικῶς
Brevity		συντόμως
Appropriateness		εὐπρεπῶς
Elaboration	ἐγκατάσκευος λόγος or κατασκευή	κομψῶς[19]

The passage whence this conjecture arises would appear to be decisive
in its favor; still, it may be useful to note that corroboration regarding the
status of forcefulness, brevity, and appropriateness is easily located in
both Περὶ ποιημάτων and Περὶ ῥητορικῆς. Indeed, forcefulness is counted
as an excellence of prose expression at Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, XXVII
6–12, and it is associated with clarity as an objective of rhetorical
expression in Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Book IV, at I 177 XVII 23—XVIII 2.
Similarly, brevity is linked with clarity as a quality proper to expression
in prose discourse at Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, XXVIII 7–17, and as a
desirable outcome of expression in rhetorical discourse at Περὶ ῥητορικῆς,
Book IV, I 176 XVII 14–17. Finally, appropriateness is twice described as
a requirement for good prose discourses in Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, at
VII 11–15 and likewise at XXXI 33–XXXII 6.

[18] It is apparent from Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, XXVII 6–12 and XXIX 24–27 that
Philodemus considered ἔμφασις a quality of expression strictly associated with the
signification of a composer's thought or meaning. In the absence of further theoretical
materials on ἔμφασις in the Philodemean corpus and in view of the position on semantic
ἔμφασις generally adopted by rhetorical theorists from the Hellenistic period onward (see
Heinrich Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der
Literaturwissenschaft I [Munich 1960] 450–53, and Kustus [above, note 7] 159–99), it seems
almost certain that Philodemus conceived of ἔμφασις as the forceful use of language to
express a meaning deeper or broader than that literally conveyed by the composer's words.

[19] The collation of ἐγκατάσκευος λόγος or κατασκευή with κομψῶς ἐκφέρειν is based upon
the semantic coextension of the terms over the expression "subtle elaboration." My proposal
is not that the two terms are exactly synonymous, but rather that the technical sense of
κομψῶς ἐκφέρειν may be subsumed under κατασκευή. (Κομψῶς and its cognates are not
elsewhere employed technically in the Philodemean corpus; see C. J. Vooijs, Lexicon
Philodemeum I [Purmerend 1934] s.v. κομψεία, κομψῶς.)

On the basis of such evidence as is offered in the foregoing, the conjecture that forcefulness, brevity, and appropriateness constitute qualities which Philodemus considered proper to rhetorical expression seems secure. This much granted, however, the question remains whether these are the sole Philodemean qualities unrepresented by significant treatment in Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Book IV.

Insofar as it is possible to answer this question at all, I believe the available evidence suggests a reply in the affirmative. Within Philodemus' works on discourse,[20] I find three passages wherein some property not included in the list of six qualities adduced above is attributed to a form of expression or discourse which might possibly fall under the rubric of rhetoric:

1. Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, VII 11–15
   [καὶ γ]ὰρ κατὰ [τὸ ε]ὖ τό τε εὐπ[ρεπ]ῶς ἄμ[α καὶ πει]στικῶ[ς
   πά]ντ᾿ ἂν εἴ[η κοινὰ καὶ π]οι[η]μάτων [κ]αὶ [λό]γων·[21]

2. Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, XXVI 23—XXVII 6
   ἡ μὲν τοίνυν ἀρετὴν λέγουσα ποιήματος, ὅταν σύνθεσις ᾖ
   τέρπ[ουσ]α τὴν ἀκοὴν ἢ κ[αλῶ]ς φερομένη καὶ τ[ὴν] διάνοιαν
   κεκρατημένως ἐκφέρουσα, διέψευσται μὲν τ[ῶι] μὴ τέρπειν
   ἦχον ἐν συνθέσει ποήματος, οὐ διορίζει δὲ τὴ[ν] ἀρετὴν τῶι
   τίνα καὶ ποίαν δεῖ διάνοιαν ἐ[κ]φέρειν μὴ ὑπογεγραφέναι καὶ
   τῶι τὸ κεκρατημένως τί π[ότ᾿] ἐστι[ι]ν ἀγνοεῖσθαι τό τ[ε
   κ]α[λ]ῶς μηδὲν ἧττον καὶ τῶι καὶ πεζοῦ λόγου ποιοῦ τινος
   κοινὴν [ἀ]ρετήν τιν᾿ αὐτὴν εἶνα[ι] κἂν λέγειν ἐνίους·[22]

3. Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, XXVII 6–12
   ἡ δὲ σύνθεσις λέξεων ἐναργῶς καὶ ἐμφατικῶς τὴν
   ὑποτεταγμένην διάνοιαν [σ]ημαίνουσα[ν]] κοι[ν]ή τ[ίς ἐσ]τι
   καὶ λόγου παντὸς ἀρετή[[s]]·[23]

Out of these passages a total of five properties (as defined above) may be abstracted: the first passage refers to perfection (τὸ εὖ) and persuasiveness

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[20] Included here are Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ὑπομνηματικόν, Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Περὶ ποιημάτων, and Περὶ μουσικῆς.

[21] Jensen (above, note 15) 21. "For also, (the necessity) for the good, the appropriate, and at the same time the persuasive, would in all respects be common for both poems and proseworks."

[22] Jensen (above, note 15) 59, 61. "Therefore, when he say it is a virtue of a poem, whenever the composition is a thing pleasing to the ear or progressing beautifully and expressing the thought masterfully, he is wrong, in that sound in the composition of a poem does not produce pleasure, and he does not define the virtue (of a poem), because he does not state which and what sort of way it is necessary to express a thought, and because it is not known what 'masterfully' means any more than what 'beautifully' means, and because some might even say that that very virtue itself is common also for prose discourse of some certain kind."

[23] Jensen (above, note 15) 61. "The composition of words which signifies the underlying thought vividly and forcefully is something universal and a virtue of every discourse."

(τὸ πειστικῶς) of prose discourses, the second to beautiful progression (καλῶς φερομένη) and masterful thought expression (τὴν διάνοιαν κεκρατημένως ἐκφέρουσα) in prose composition (σύνθεσις), the third to vivid thought signification (ἐναργῶς τὴν διάνοιαν σημαίνουσα) likewise in prose composition. With regard to these properties, my contention is that none may be recognized as a quality of expression in Philodemus, since no property is both (1) suitable as a quality of expression *per se* and (2) distinguishable from the qualities of rhetorical expression already identified.

The properties mentioned in the first passage seem to exhibit the same problem; neither is suitable as a quality of expression *per se*. In the case of τὸ εὖ, Philodemus argues explicitly at Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book II, frag. 68, 2-17, that content and its execution (i.e., expression) are equally involved in explaining its cause (αἴτιον).[24] Accordingly, it seems certain that τὸ εὖ cannot serve as a quality of expression *per se*, since its attribution is essentially dependent upon something other than expression.

A similar argument is apparently applicable to persuasiveness. In Περὶ ποιημάτων, papyrus *1676*, VI 16-24, Philodemus insists that persuasion (ψυχαγωγία) by means of discourse is not effected through expression, but rather through the thoughts expressed.[25] Consistent with this view, the

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[24] Augustus Hausrath, "Philodemi περὶ ποιημάτων libri secundi quae videntur fragmenta," *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Supplementband 17 (1890) 269. . . . κατὰ το[ῦτον τὸν τρό]πον οὔθ᾽ ἡ λέξι[ς οὔτε τὰ ὑ]ποκείμενα οὔτε [τῶν συμβε]βη[κό]των οὐθ[ὲν αἴτιον] τοῦ εὖ. πρὸς μέντοι τ[ὸ] γράφεσθαι τὸ πόημα ἴσον ἔν τε τῆι ὕληι καὶ τῶι ἐνεργοῦντι αὐτήν—ἑνὸς γὰρ ὁποτέρου οὖν ἀρθέντος οὐκ[έ]τι νοητὸν ποίωι τρόπωι πόημα ἔσται. εἰ δὲ μ[ηδὲν] τούτων αἴτιον τοῦ εὖ ἀποδιδούς, ἐξ αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν [τοῦ] εὖ δο[κ]ῶν ἀπο[δι]δόν[αι, τὴν?] αι]τίαν τοῦ εὖ οὐκ ἀποδίδ[ω]σιν· ". . . according to this method neither the style nor the circumstances nor anything of the accidental attributes is a cause of perfection. With regard to the writing, of course, the poem is equal in the material and in the execution of it—for if one of the two is accordingly denied, then it is no longer conceivable in what way it will be a poem. But if (this method) explains the cause of perfection as none of these, then seeming to explain the cause of perfection apart from them, it does not explain the cause of perfection."

[25] Josef Heidmann, *Der Papyrus 1676 der herculanensischen Bibliothek (Philodemos Περὶ ποιημάτων): Text und Übersetzung*, Diss. Bonn 1937 (Bonn 1937) 18. τ[ὴν δὲ τῶ]ν διαν[οιῶν] ἀλ[λη]λουχία[ν, ἔτι] δὲ καὶ τὴν χύσιν τῶ[ν] λέξεων τοῦ βίου χορη[γήσ]αντος ἡ σύνθεσις ἰδ[ία γ]ίνεται τῶν ποιητῶν, οὐ καίριος οὐδ᾽ ἐπαινουμένη καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι π[ρο]σπαρίστησι διαν[οί]ας, αἷς ψ[υχ]αγωγοῦσιν . . . "When life furnishes the conjunction of the thoughts and the fluency of the words besides, the composition becomes a personal work of the poets, but it is not appropriate that it be praised with respect to itself, but rather because it calls· to mind the thoughts, by means of which (the poets) persuade . . ." My argument here presumes that πειστικῶς at Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, VII 13, is used in a psychagogic sense. I feel confident in this presumption because the immediate context does not suggest some other sense (the word is not otherwise used in Book V) and because Philodemus employs its adjectival form (i.e., πειστικός) exclusively in the sense I propose throughout Περὶ ῥητορικῆς (see, e.g., I 93 LV 1; 295 XIX 3 [= II 12 XIX 5]; 379 CIV 7; II 17 XXIII 10), the only other work in which any form of the word is attested (see C. J. Vooijs and D. A. van Krevelen, *Lexicon Philodemeum* II [Amsterdam 1941] s.v. πειστικός). For the

attribution of τὸ πειστικῶς can never be based on expression alone; thus, persuasiveness also is unsuitable as a quality of expression *per se*.

The properties named in the second passage evidently manifest both types of difficulties mentioned above. Not unlike τὸ εὖ and τὸ πειστικῶς, the property of composition which Philodemus calls καλῶς φερομένη— beautiful progression—is problematic in that it cannot be evaluated solely with respect to expression. As Philodemus points out in Περὶ ποιημάτων, papyrus *994*, XXIII 10–22,[26] the auditory pleasance (or beauty[27]) associated with compositional progression is partly dependent upon the speaker's pronunciation of the text. Since each speaker's ability is natural and unique, the same text may manifest beautiful progression when pronounced by one speaker, but not when pronounced by another.[28] Therefore, because the property καλῶς φερομένη can conceivably arise only through the interaction of expression and pronunciation, it cannot serve as a quality of expression *per se*.

The property of composition to which Philodemus refers as τὴν διάνοιαν κεκρατημένως ἐκφέρουσα—masterful thought expression—seems problematic in another respect. Crucial here is Philodemus' suggestion at Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, XXVI 32–36, that the property arises simply as a result of the composer's discernment of τίνα καὶ ποίαν δεῖ διάνοιαν ἐκφέρειν, which and what sort of way it is necessary to express a thought. For, if indeed this is Philodemus' analysis of masterful thought expression, then the property is really indistinguishable from the set of Philodemean qualities already identified as belonging to rhetorical expression, since these qualities, taken as a whole, provide explicit guidance in the matter of which and what sort of way a composer should express thoughts. Thus, while masterful thought expression may be the right *type* of property to serve as a quality of expression *per se*, it does

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"persuasive" sense of ψυχαγωγέω and ψυχαγωγία, see I 148 III 5, 12, and Hausrath (above, note 24) 266 (frag. 61). Cf. LSJ and Vooijs and van Krevelen s.v. ψυχαγωγέω, ψυχαγωγία.

[26] I here refer to the text of Francesco Sbordone, "Filodemo e la teorica dell'eufonia," *RAAN* NS 30 (1955) 31. For the text reprinted and translation, see Dirk M. Schenkeveld, "OI KPITIKOI in Philodemus," *Mnemosyne* 21 (1968) 197.

[27] In the discussion of composition at Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, XXVI 26–28, "pleasing the ear" is specified as "progressing beautifully." I am here merely accepting this specification as part of the account of the ἀρετὴ ποιήματος that Philodemus suggests may be applicable to prose discourse.

[28] Schenkeveld (above, note 26) 193 reaches a similar conclusion using papyrus *1676* XI 11–23 as his starting point: "In the previous columns Philodemus had argued that there was no constant criterion by which one could declare that one line was beautiful, or another ugly. As proof he offers the observation that every actor differs from another by his pronunciation of lines. When an actor produces a line melodiously, he can do so only because he has a natural ability for it, not because under all circumstances that line will be pronounced beautifully by everyone." Philodemus' consideration of the issues treated here was not limited to Περὶ ποιημάτων; see, e.g., the fragmentary discussion of auditory pleasantness and its relation to pronounceability at I 162 I 1—164 III 4.

not constitute a quality of rhetorical expression additional to those already recognized.

An almost identical problem apparently pertains to the property of composition cited in the third passage, viz., ἐναργῶς τὴν διάνοιαν σημαίνουσα—vivid thought signification. At Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Book IV, I 177 XVII 23—XVIII 2, Philodemus refers to the property of ἐνάργεια in connection with rhetorical expression:

Πλανῶσ<ι>ν δ[ὲ] τῆς ἐμφάσεως ὡς οὔσης σαφηνεία[ς ἢ
σ]υ[ντελούσης²⁹] τὴν ὑπ᾽ αὐ[τῶν καλουμέ]νην [ἐνά]ργειαν το[ῦ
μεταφέρειν δι]ὰ παντός.³⁰

Quite important in this passage is that Philodemus evidently identifies συντελοῦσα τὴν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καλουμένην ἐνάργειαν with σαφήνεια; put simply, he seems to say that vividness of expression is just another name for clarity of expression.³¹ Now, presuming that Philodemus' technical conceptions of ἐναργῶς τὴν διάνοιαν σημαίνουσα in Περὶ ποιημάτων and ἐνάργεια in Περὶ ῥητορικῆς are roughly equivalent, then such an identification clearly disallows any significant distinction between vivid thought signification and clarity.³² But clarity, as shown above, is certainly to be identified as a Philodemean quality of rhetorical expression. Thus, on account of its indistinguishability from clarity, vivid thought signification cannot be recognized as an additional quality of like nature.

In short, my present argument is this. Because none of the five properties just discussed may be recognized as a quality of rhetorical expression (apart from those already adduced above), there is no evidence in Philodemus' works related to discourse that any quality other than forcefulness, brevity, and appropriateness is both considered by

²⁹ I here emend Sudhaus' reading of σ]υ[ντελοῦντος] at I 177 XVII 25.

³⁰ "They are misled with regard to forcefulness in the opinion that it is clarity or accomplishes (as it is called by them) the vividness of using metaphor continually."

³¹ Vooijs and van Krevelen define these and all Philodemean uses of ἐνάργεια and σαφήνεια with the same word—"perspicuitas" (Vooijs [above, note 19] s.v. ἐνάργεια; Vooijs and van Krevelen [above, note 25] s.v. σαφήνεια).

³² Philodemus would appear to draw *some sort* of distinction between what is composed ἐναργῶς and what is composed σαφῶς at Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, XXVII 17–25. However, this passage need not pose a problem for my interpretation, since it seems quite plausible that Philodemus here treats a conception of ἐνάργεια that is consistent with, but less robust than his own conception of σαφήνεια. I am attracted to this account of the relationship between ἐνάργεια and σαφήνεια, because it explains not only (1) Philodemus' terminological distinction at XXVII 17–25, but also (2) his statement that ἐνάργεια is a desirable attribute of prose discourse at XXVII 6–12 and (3) his omission of ἐναργῶς from the list of expressive qualities suitable to both poetry and prose at XXIX 28–33. (For an account of the relationship between ἐνάργεια and σαφήνεια identical to that which I ascribe to Philodemus, see Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 4.2.64.)

Philodemus to be proper to rhetorical expression and unrepresented by significant treatment in Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Book IV.

Accordingly, since the discursive corpus would appear to be the most sensible place for Philodemus to settle such a matter, it seems quite safe to conclude that he considered exactly six qualities proper to rhetorical expression, viz., those represented in Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Book IV, Ἑλληνικὴ ἑρμηνεία, σαφήνεια, and κατασκευή, as well as those discoverable on the basis of Philodemus' remarks in Περὶ ποιημάτων, Book V, ἔμφασις, συντομία, and εὐπρέπεια. I believe this conclusion is important, because it suggests that Philodemus' analysis of the qualities proper to expression did not merely duplicate some standard theoretical account, but followed an independent line of expressive thought.[33]

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[33] As compared with other Hellenistic taxonomies (see Richard Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht* [Leipzig 1885] 394–96, and above, note 14), Philodemus' analysis is original at least insofar as it includes ἔμφασις.